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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Mark Klinger and Linda Neyer appeal from the decision of 
the district court denying them costs, attorney's fees and 
the full amount of pre-judgment interest they sought in 
their otherwise successful bad faith action against State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. We conclude 
that the district court erred only in one aspect--the reasons 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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it gave for denying the request for attorney's fees--but that 
its error was in its explanation, not in its application of 
legal precepts and does not affect the amount to which 






In August 1992, Klinger and Neyer were seriously injured 
in a head-on collision while riding in Klinger's van, which 
was one of two vehicles owned by him and insured by State 
Farm. The other driver's insurance was inadequate to 
compensate them for their injuries, so Klinger and Neyer 
filed underinsured motorist claims against the two State 
Farm policies. 
 
State Farm disputed the amount of coverage available 
under these insurance policies, and the parties agreed to 
bifurcate the issues of coverage and damages and to 
arbitrate them separately.1 Attorney Richard Wix 
represented State Farm. Attorney David L. Lutz represented 
Klinger and Neyer. 
 
In October 1993, the arbitrators determined that the 
coverage available under Klinger's two policies was 
$115,000. That established, in November, Attorney Lutz 
sent two letters to Wix demanding that State Farm tender 
the policy limits to his clients. Wix, however, never apprised 
State Farm of either of these letters. State Farm contends 
that it did not know the results of the arbitration because 
its attorney, Wix, did not answer his phone calls. A State 
Farm claims representative, however, did not personally 
visit Wix's office until March 1994. Nonetheless, in January 
1994, Attorney Lutz told Timothy Spader, a State Farm 
claims representative, the results of the arbitration and of 
his demand letters, when Spader happened to be talking to 
Lutz about another matter. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In April 1993, before the coverage arbitration was held, State Farm 
offered each plaintiff $15,000, an amount representing the policy limits 
as State Farm interpreted them. This offer was refused. 
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Spader then contacted Attorney Wix, who promised him 
a letter documenting the status of the case. After receiving 
nothing, Spader finally visited Wix's office personally in 
March 1994 and obtained some medical records and 
documentary data. Only then did Spader contact Attorney 
Lutz, who had earlier written that he was considering a bad 
faith claim and stated that he would provide State Farm 
with whatever information it needed to evaluate the extent 
of damages. 
 
Still State Farm did nothing. In March 1994, the 
arbitrators scheduled the damages arbitration for June 28. 
Again Lutz demanded that State Farm pay the policy limits. 
Again, State Farm's attorney apparently failed to forward 
this request to State Farm. In April, Lutz went around State 
Farm's attorney, writing directly to Spader, and inquired 
whether State Farm was interested in settling the case. Still 
State Farm offered its insureds nothing. 
 
In June, although the hearing was scheduled for less 
than a week later, and even though Wix himself now 
recommended that State Farm tender them the policy 
limits, State Farm made no offer to pay the appellants 
anything. Instead, State Farm sought a stay of the hearing. 
Attorney Lutz refused, and they arbitrated damages. The 
arbitrators awarded $115,000 to Klinger and $70,000 to 
Neyer. Finally, on August 2, 1994, a full two years after the 
accident, and months after State Farm had all the 
information necessary to evaluate Klinger and Neyer's 




Klinger and Neyer filed suit in the Dauphin County Court 
of Common Pleas, alleging that State Farm's delay in paying 
their claims was a display of bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. 
§ 8371. State Farm removed the case to federal court based 
on diversity of citizenship. The case was tried before a jury, 
which awarded punitive damages to each plaintiffs in the 
amount of $150,000. State Farm then filed a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a 
new trial, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and 59(a). The district 
court denied this motion. Klinger and Neyer filed motions 
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seeking interest, costs and attorney's fees under§ 8371. 
The district court awarded interest, but denied the costs 
and fees, opining that "State Farm ha[d] been adequately 







State Farm first argues that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the jury's verdict of bad faith. It also asserts that 
the jury was improperly instructed on the test to be applied 
in determining the existence of bad faith under 




The standard for bad faith claims under § 8371 is set 
forth in Terletsky v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 
A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 659 
A.2d 560 (Pa. 1995). There, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court applied a two-part test, both elements of which must 
be supported with clear and convincing evidence: (1) that 
the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits; 
and (2) that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its 
lack of reasonable basis. The district court instructed the 
jury accordingly. The Terletsky court also stated, however, 
that 
 
"[b]ad faith" on part of insurer is any frivolous or 
unfounded refusal to pay proceeds of a policy; it is not 
necessary that such refusal be fraudulent. For 
purposes of an action against an insurer for failure to 
pay a claim, such conduct imports a dishonest purpose 
and means a breach of a known duty (i.e., good faith 
and fair dealing), through some motive of self-interest 
or ill will; mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad 
faith. 
 
Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990)). 
From this, State Farm argues that a third element must be 
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satisfied, to wit, that the insurer was motivated by an 
improper purpose such as ill will or self-interest. 
 
We reject that reading of Terletsky. Although the 
definition the court recited did advert to a "dishonest 
purpose" such as "self-interest or ill will[,]" this is dictum. 
Moreover, State Farm's self-interest is the only plausible 
explanation for its delay. Nonetheless, we need not reach 
that issue: A page later the court actually applied the two- 
part test: 
 
 To recover under a claim of bad faith, the Terletskys 
were required to show that Prudential lacked a 
reasonable basis for partially denying payment . . . and 
that Prudential recklessly disregarded a lack of 
reasonable basis in denying the payment. Prudential's 
actions, however, were reasonably based. 
 
Id. at 689-90. In our prediction of how the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would measure bad faith claims, we will 
rely on the actual test that Terletsky applied and refrain 
from creating a third part based only on dictum quoted 
from Black's Law Dictionary. Accordingly, we conclude that 




We also believe that the evidence was sufficient for a jury 
to conclude that State Farm lacked a reasonable basis for 
refusing to pay the appellants, and knew or recklessly 
disregarded that fact. State Farm acknowledged at oral 
argument that it is chargeable with the actions of its 
attorney. As such, it is also chargeable with his inactions. 
Moreover, Mr. Spader testified that, as early as March 
1994, he knew that liability was clear and that State Farm 
had received a demand package indicating that both 
Klinger and Neyer had sustained serious injuries. Next, Wix 
himself testified that he advised State Farm to tender the 
policy limits before the damages arbitration. Yet, State 
Farm never offered to pay Klinger and Neyer anything 
beyond the early and clearly inadequate offer it made before 
the coverage arbitration. Finally, plaintiffs' expert testified 
that State Farm acted recklessly and unreasonably. Hence 
there is ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
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have concluded that State Farm knew or recklessly 
disregarded the fact that it had no reasonable basis for 





State Farm challenges the bad faith award to Ms. Neyer 
for yet another reason. Neyer demanded $115,000, but the 
arbitrator ultimately awarded only $70,000. Thus, State 
Farm argues, as a matter of law it could not have acted in 
bad faith by refusing to offer the full $115,000. 
 
State Farm relies on Kaufmann v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
794 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1992). First, that is a district 
court case and not precedential. Second, there, the issue 
was whether the limits of multiple policies could be stacked 
for a total of $1 million in coverage; if they could not, the 
plaintiff 's recovery was limited to $500,000. Aetna offered 
$500,000 to the plaintiffs without prejudice to its litigation 
of the stacking issue, and they accepted the partial 
settlement. The arbitrators then awarded $950,000, and 
Aetna timely paid over the remaining $450,000. The court 
opined: 
 
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Kaufmann's injuries were so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. State Farm argues that it reasonably relied upon its counsel. We 
would never opine to the contrary, at least for certain advice and 
representation. Nonetheless, because this point is argued we find it 
necessary to remark that representation is not an excuse for the 
insurer's failure to perform its obligations under the policy it issued to 
the insured. Here, State Farm's attorney would not even answer his 
phone calls. With admittedly clear liability, serious injuries and Mr. 
Klinger on welfare because he could no longer work, it was incumbent 
upon State Farm to do more. And because counsel for the insureds 
cannot simply make an "end-run" around the insurer's attorney to deal 
directly with the insurer, the insurer may not hide behind this 
relationship to argue that it reasonably ignored its obligations under the 
insurance policy to its insureds, one of which is to pay them 
compensation if injured. Otherwise, an insurer could simply hire 
counsel, bury its head in the sand, pay when ordered to do so, retain the 
use of the insured's money in the meantime, and escape without adverse 
consequences. 
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severe that Aetna should have waived its contractual 
right to arbitration and simply tendered $1 million.. . . 
The arbitrators then awarded less than the full $1 
million stacked limit, albeit only $50,000 less. The 
arbitrators' decision belies plaintiffs' contention that 
they were plainly entitled to the full amount which 
their policy provided as a limit. Under these 
circumstances, no reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that Aetna's decision to proceed to arbitration 
constituted bad faith. 
 
Id. at 141. 
 
Finally, Kaufman is not persuasive. Aetna had at least 
tendered the $500,000 in coverage that was not disputed, 
whereas State Farm never made any offer to Neyer either 
after the coverage arbitration was decided, or when the 
extent of her injuries had become clear to it. A rational jury 
could well have concluded that State Farm, by not making 
an offer to Neyer based upon some objective criteria it 
believed compensated adequately for her injuries, 
knowingly or recklessly acted without reasonable basis. The 
mere fact that the arbitrators ultimately decided that Neyer 
was entitled to less compensation than the amount she 
wanted is not a sufficient basis to relieve State Farm from 
its responsibility to offer what was reasonably due her. Had 
it done so, both the damages arbitration and this suit 





State Farm also takes issue with the jury's decision to 
impose punitive damages. It argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to support such an award and that, in any 
event, the matter should have been decided by the court 




We will look to Pennsylvania law governing punitive 
damages to determine whether the award was proper. 
Pennsylvania has adopted section 908 of the Restatement 
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(Second) of Torts governing punitive damages. Delahanty v. 
First Pa. Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243, 1263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1983). They are awarded to punish a defendant for 
outrageous conduct, which is defined as an act which, in 
addition to creating "actual damages, also imports insult or 
outrage, and is committed with a view to oppress or is done 
in contempt of plaintiffs' rights." Id. Both intent and 
reckless indifference will constitute a sufficient mental 
state. See id. 
 
Here, the district court concluded that the jury could 
have reasonably found that State Farm's conduct, to wit, 
relying on its counsel despite his non-performance and 
never making an offer to pay its insureds before the 
damages arbitration, was egregious enough to warrant 
punitive damages. We agree. Insurance contracts create 
affirmative duties: The insured must pay premiums; the 
insurer must pay when its insured suffers an insured 
event. There was testimony from plaintiffs' expert that State 
Farm's conduct was in reckless disregard of plaintiffs' 
rights because it "didn't have a good reason for not making 
an offer[ ]" and because State Farm was not "considering 
the interests of their -- of Klinger and Neyer who were their 
insureds." He added that "[t]hey made them no offer when 
there was no reason for not doing this. There was clear 
liability and serious injuries." When asked how he would 
characterize that type of conduct, he answered, "I think 
that's disregarding, recklessly disregarding the rights of 
their insured." He then stated that, in his opinion, this 
conduct was outrageous. This testimony provided the jury 




State Farm also argues that the issue of punitive 
damages was required by the terms of § 8371 to be decided 
by the court and not placed before the jury because the 
statute provides that "the court" may impose, inter alia, 
punitive damages. Frankly, we fail to see the harm. Clearly, 
the court can ask for an advisory verdict. Second, the court 
could have rejected the verdict. Finally, it was the court 
that entered judgment on the verdict. Hence, it had control 
at all stages. 
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Moreover, as State Farm acknowledges, the Seventh 
Amendment itself provides the right to trial by jury in suits 
at common law. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192, 
94 S. Ct. 1005, 1007 (1974). Arguing, however, that the 
Seventh Amendment provides no right to a jury trial on 
punitive damages in a § 8371 case, State Farm relies on 
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987). 
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the amount of a 
statutory civil penalty under the Clean Water Act could be 
decided by the trial court, id. at 427, 107 S. Ct. at 1840, 
even though the issue of liability implicated the right to 
trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 423, 107 
S. Ct. at 1838. It reasoned that, because "Congress itself 
may fix the civil penalties, it may delegate that 
determination to trial judges[,]" id. at 427, 107 S. Ct. at 
1840, noting that calculations of civil penalties involve 
exercises of discretion "traditionally performed by judges." 
Id. 
 
We find Tull inapposite. Rather, we believe that the 
appropriate precedent is Curtis, in which the Court held 
that a "damages action under [42 U.S.C. § 3612] . . . is 
analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at 
common law. More important, the relief sought here-- 
actual and punitive damages--is the traditional relief 
offered in the courts of law." Id. at 195-96, 94 S. Ct. at 
1009. Thus, we conclude that the punitive damages remedy 
in a statutory bad faith action under § 8371 triggers the 
Seventh Amendment jury trial right, a result consistent 
with several cases that have decided the issue. See Fahy v. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 678, 679 (M.D. 
Pa. 1995); Younis Bros. & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 
882 F. Supp. 1468, 1470, 1476 (E.D. Pa. 1994); 
MacFarland v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 818 
F. Supp. 108, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Thomson v. Prudential 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 91-4073, 1992 WL 210088, *4 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1992).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. State Farm relies additionally on three district court cases in which 
the courts held that the issue of punitive damages under § 8371 was for 
the court rather than the jury. See Giampa v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 
93-4948, 1993 WL 505614 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1993); Gilderman v. State 
Farm Ins. Cos., No. 91-6353, 1991 WL 276017 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1991); 
Carson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, No. 91-3113, 1991 WL 147469 (E.D. 
Pa. July 24, 1991). Notably, however, none of these cases analyzed the 
issue in a Seventh Amendment context. 
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Klinger and Neyer appeal from the district court's 
decision not to award pre-judgment interest, costs and 
attorney's fees. We have examined their arguments with 
respect to the timing of pre-judgment interest and the 
awarding of costs and find them to be without merit. The 
fee issue requires a little more discussion. 
 
The district court denied attorney's fees because it 
believed that State Farm had been punished enough by the 
punitive damages the jury had awarded. This reasoning is 
problematic. Indeed at argument, counsel for State Farm 
acknowledged that the statute provides "both punitive and 
remedial" relief. In a general sense, punitive damages are 
awarded to punish the defendant for its bad faith in failing 
to do that which it was contractually obligated to do. 
Attorney's fees, however, are awarded to compensate the 
plaintiff for having to pay an attorney to get that to which 
they were contractually entitled. Along with interest, costs 
and delay damages, the object of an attorney fee award is 
to make the successful plaintiff completely whole. 
 
Appellants here were put to the unnecessary expense of 
having to hire an attorney by State Farm's refusal to do for 
them what it had contracted to do. Hence, appellants were 
damaged economically as surely as if State Farm had 
purposely or negligently rammed one of its automobiles into 
appellants'. The obvious design of the Pennsylvania statute 
is, first, to place Klinger and Neyer in the same economic 
position they would have been in had the insurer performed 
as it promised, by awarding attorney's fees as additional 
damages; and second, to punish State Farm for giving 
primacy to its own self-interest over that of the appellants 
by awarding punitive damages. The separate provisions of 
this statute answer both needs. Thus, it would appear that 
in refusing to award attorney's fees because the defendant 
had been "punished" enough, the court erred. Nonetheless, 
we believe that the error was only in how the court 
explained the award, but not in its application of the law. 
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The district court obviously intended to both punish State 
Farm and to make the appellants whole, and it believed 
that the punitive damage award accomplished both. Hence, 




Because the district court's rulings on the merits were 
legally correct and the jury's verdicts supported by 
sufficient evidence, we will affirm State Farm's cross- 
appeals; and because the court's error is harmless and it is 
unnecessary to remand, we will also affirm Klinger's and 
Neyer's primary appeals. 
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